Sequential voting with abstention
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2485490
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.06.007zbMATH Open1099.91037OpenAlexW2066985590MaRDI QIDQ2485490FDOQ2485490
Authors: Marco Battaglini
Publication date: 5 August 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.007
Recommendations
- Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
- Sophisticated voting under the sequential Voting by Veto
- Sequential voting with confirmation network
- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
- Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
- Sequential vote buying
- Anonymous voting rules with abstention: weighted voting
Cites Work
Cited In (20)
- Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests
- Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
- On the drawbacks of large committees
- Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
- Committees, sequential voting and transparency
- SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS? A WELFARE ANALYSIS
- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence
- The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting
- Impact of information concerning the popularity of candidates on loss-averse voters' abstention
- Pivots versus signals in elections
- Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
- Super tuesday: campaign finance and the dynamics of sequential elections
- Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?
- Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting
- Large elections and interim turnout
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms
- An experimental study of strategic voting and accuracy of verdicts with sequential and simultaneous voting
- Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
This page was built for publication: Sequential voting with abstention
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2485490)