Sequential voting with abstention

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.007zbMath1099.91037OpenAlexW2066985590MaRDI QIDQ2485490

Marco Battaglini

Publication date: 5 August 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.007

zbMATH Keywords

Information aggregationSequential elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (15)

Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-Biased Voters ⋮ SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS? A WELFARE ANALYSIS ⋮ On the drawbacks of large committees ⋮ Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms ⋮ Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting? ⋮ Large elections and interim turnout ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting ⋮ Committees, sequential voting and transparency ⋮ Pivots versus signals in elections ⋮ The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting ⋮ Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency ⋮ Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence ⋮ An experimental study of strategic voting and accuracy of verdicts with sequential and simultaneous voting ⋮ Super tuesday: campaign finance and the dynamics of sequential elections

Cites Work

• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting

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