Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms

DOI10.1007/S00182-012-0346-6zbMATH Open1281.91113OpenAlexW2092002824MaRDI QIDQ378333FDOQ378333

Authors: Inbar Aricha, Rann Smorodinsky 

Publication date: 11 November 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0346-6

Recommendations

• Mechanism design with information acquisition
• Mechanisms for information elicitation
• Communication in economic mechanisms
• Sequential Information Design
• Eliciting information from a committee

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designinformation elicitationrevelation principlesequential mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Sequential voting with abstention
• Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
• Non-cooperative computation: Boolean functions with correctness and exclusivity

Cited In (4)

• Sequential Information Design
• Communication in economic mechanisms
• Data curation from privacy-aware agents
• Mechanisms for information elicitation

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