Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms

DOI10.1007/S00182-012-0346-6MaRDI QIDQ378333zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Inbar Aricha, Rann Smorodinsky

Publication date 11 November 2013

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0346-6

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designinformation elicitationrevelation principlesequential mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Mechanism design with information acquisition
• Mechanisms for information elicitation
• Communication in economic mechanisms
• Sequential Information Design
• Eliciting information from a committee

Cites work

• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Non-cooperative computation: Boolean functions with correctness and exclusivity
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
• Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
• Sequential voting with abstention

Cited in

(4)

• Sequential Information Design
• Communication in economic mechanisms
• Data curation from privacy-aware agents
• Mechanisms for information elicitation

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