Mechanisms for information elicitation
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Publication:2389691
DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2008.08.005zbMATH Open1184.68537OpenAlexW2118208231MaRDI QIDQ2389691FDOQ2389691
Authors: Aviv Zohar, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein 
Publication date: 17 July 2009
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2008.08.005
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Cites Work
- Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Microeconomic theory
- Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations
- Robust solutions of uncertain linear programs
- Clique is hard to approximate within \(n^{1-\epsilon}\)
- Proper Scores for Probability Forecasters
- Agreeing to disagree
- The complexity and approximability of finding maximum feasible subsystems of linear relations
- Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
- Iterated expectations and common priors
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Cited In (16)
- Sharing information with competitors
- An axiomatic characterization of wagering mechanisms
- Robust scoring rules
- A mechanism for the elicitation of second-order belief and subjective information structure
- Eliciting information from a committee
- A mechanism for eliciting the mean and quantiles of a random variable
- Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
- Putting peer prediction under the micro(economic)scope and making truth-telling focal
- Incentive-compatible surveys via posterior probabilities
- Dynamic belief elicitation
- Parametric prediction from parametric agents
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Simple bets to elicit private signals
- Equilibrium selection in information elicitation without verification via information monotonicity
- A Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilities
- Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms
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