Mechanisms for information elicitation

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2008.08.005MaRDI QIDQ2389691zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Aviv Zohar, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Publication date 17 July 2009

Published in Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2008.08.005

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designinformation elicitationinformation trade

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4032498 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1322222 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1975133 (Why is no real title available?)
• Agreeing to disagree
• Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
• Clique is hard to approximate within \(n^{1-\epsilon}\)
• Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations
• Iterated expectations and common priors
• Microeconomic theory
• Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
• Proper Scores for Probability Forecasters
• Robust solutions of uncertain linear programs
• Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation
• The complexity and approximability of finding maximum feasible subsystems of linear relations

Cited in

(16)

• Sharing information with competitors
• A Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilities
• Putting peer prediction under the micro(economic)scope and making truth-telling focal
• Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
• Eliciting information from a committee
• Parametric prediction from parametric agents
• A mechanism for the elicitation of second-order belief and subjective information structure
• An axiomatic characterization of wagering mechanisms
• Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms
• A mechanism for eliciting the mean and quantiles of a random variable
• Robust scoring rules
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5178094 (Why is no real title available?)
• Simple bets to elicit private signals
• Equilibrium selection in information elicitation without verification via information monotonicity
• Incentive-compatible surveys via posterior probabilities
• Dynamic belief elicitation

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