Mechanisms for information elicitation
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Publication:2389691
DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2008.08.005zbMATH Open1184.68537OpenAlexW2118208231MaRDI QIDQ2389691FDOQ2389691
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Aviv Zohar
Publication date: 17 July 2009
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2008.08.005
Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)
Cites Work
- Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation
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- Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations
- Robust solutions of uncertain linear programs
- Clique is hard to approximate within \(n^{1-\epsilon}\)
- Proper Scores for Probability Forecasters
- Agreeing to disagree
- The complexity and approximability of finding maximum feasible subsystems of linear relations
- Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
- Iterated expectations and common priors
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Cited In (3)
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