Mechanisms for information elicitation

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2008.08.005zbMath1184.68537OpenAlexW2118208231MaRDI QIDQ2389691

Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Aviv Zohar

Publication date: 17 July 2009

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2008.08.005

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designinformation elicitationinformation trade

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Related Items (1)

Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Agreeing to disagree
• Iterated expectations and common priors
• Robust solutions of uncertain linear programs
• The complexity and approximability of finding maximum feasible subsystems of linear relations
• Clique is hard to approximate within \(n^{1-\epsilon}\)
• Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
• Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
• Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation
• Proper Scores for Probability Forecasters
• Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations

This page was built for publication: Mechanisms for information elicitation