Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2010.10.007zbMath1216.68332OpenAlexW2162930353WikidataQ57377353 ScholiaQ57377353MaRDI QIDQ543619

Nicholas R. Jennings, Enrico H. Gerding, Alex Rogers, Athanasios Papakonstantinou

Publication date: 17 June 2011

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/271316/1/4120.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

multiagent systemsmechanism designscoring rulesauction theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computing methodologies for information systems (hypertext navigation, interfaces, decision support, etc.) (68U35) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (3)

Eliciting social knowledge for creditworthiness assessment ⋮ Algorithms and mechanisms for procuring services with uncertain durations using redundancy ⋮ Multi-dimensional procurement auction under uncertain and asymmetric information

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