Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
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Publication:543619
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2010.10.007zbMath1216.68332WikidataQ57377353 ScholiaQ57377353MaRDI QIDQ543619
Nicholas R. Jennings, Enrico H. Gerding, Alex Rogers, Athanasios Papakonstantinou
Publication date: 17 June 2011
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/271316/1/4120.pdf
68U35: Computing methodologies for information systems (hypertext navigation, interfaces, decision support, etc.)
91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory
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