On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation
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Publication:5501488
Programming involving graphs or networks (90C35) Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science (68R10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Distributed systems (68M14) Network protocols (68M12)
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