On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation

<a class="pub-badge pub-badge--doi" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1011767.1011782" rel="nofollow">DOI 10.1145/1011767.1011782</a><a class="pub-badge pub-badge--grey" href="https://zbmath.org/1323.68030" rel="nofollow">zbMATH</a><a class="pub-badge pub-badge--grey" href="https://openalex.org/works/W2043466468" rel="nofollow">OpenAlex</a><a class="pub-badge pub-badge--mardi" href="https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/wiki/Item:Q5501488" rel="nofollow">MaRDI QID Q5501488</a><a class="pub-badge pub-badge--grey" href="https://fdo.portal.mardi4nfdi.de/fdo/Q5501488" rel="nofollow">FDO</a>

Authors Amir Ronen, Artur Czumaj

Publication date 3 August 2015

Published in Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1145/1011767.1011782

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designtask allocationfrugalityexpected payment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Programming involving graphs or networks (90C35) Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science (68R10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Distributed systems (68M14) Network protocols (68M12)

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