On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation
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Publication:5501488
DOI10.1145/1011767.1011782zbMath1323.68030OpenAlexW2043466468MaRDI QIDQ5501488
Publication date: 3 August 2015
Published in: Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1011767.1011782
Programming involving graphs or networks (90C35) Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science (68R10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Distributed systems (68M14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Network protocols (68M12)
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