On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation
DOI10.1145/1011767.1011782zbMATH Open1323.68030OpenAlexW2043466468MaRDI QIDQ5501488FDOQ5501488
Authors: Amir Ronen, Artur Czumaj 
Publication date: 3 August 2015
Published in: Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1011767.1011782
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Programming involving graphs or networks (90C35) Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science (68R10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Distributed systems (68M14) Network protocols (68M12)
Cited In (8)
- Trust-based mechanisms for robust and efficient task allocation in the presence of execution uncertainty
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- Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
- The price of polarization: Estimating task prices under routine‐biased technical change
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- Bounding the payment of approximate truthful mechanisms
- First-passage percolation on a ladder graph, and the path cost in a VCG auction
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