Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
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Publication:2819541
DOI10.1145/301250.301287zbMath1346.68246OpenAlexW2039634593WikidataQ56815520 ScholiaQ56815520MaRDI QIDQ2819541
Publication date: 29 September 2016
Published in: Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/301250.301287
Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Randomized algorithms (68W20) Distributed algorithms (68W15) General topics in the theory of algorithms (68W01)
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