A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing

DOI10.1007/s00453-011-9602-6zbMath1262.91030arXiv1001.1901MaRDI QIDQ692628

Emmanouil Pountourakis, Angelina Vidali

Publication date: 6 December 2012

Published in: Algorithmica, Algorithms – ESA 2010 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1001.1901

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

90B80: Discrete location and assignment

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

Related Items

Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?, Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences, Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains

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