Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
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Publication:2437817
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.005zbMath1282.91129OpenAlexW1969408115MaRDI QIDQ2437817
Publication date: 13 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.005
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (17)
Sharing sequential values in a network ⋮ Beyond Moulin mechanisms ⋮ Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good ⋮ Is Shapley cost sharing optimal? ⋮ Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation ⋮ Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks ⋮ Modularity and greed in double auctions ⋮ Routing-proofness in congestion-prone networks ⋮ On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences ⋮ A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing ⋮ An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method ⋮ Free intermediation in resource transmission ⋮ Coalitional efficient profit-sharing ⋮ Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains ⋮ An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions
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