An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions

DOI10.3390/G10030031MaRDI QIDQ2307359zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Karl Jandoc, Ruben Juarez

Publication date 27 March 2020

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030031

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationexperimentpower accumulationself-enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Review text

Summary: We study a model in which agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource by forming coalitions with other agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We conduct an economic experiment using this model to investigate possible behavioral factors that may explain deviations from theoretical predictions. The main findings show that agents display rational behavior when forming coalitions, especially when they know that a large proportion of their opponents play myopic strategies from the outset. Over time, however, agents learn to behave more strategically and even more rationally, thus enabling agents to display more of the behavior predicted by the coalition formation model with farsighted agents.

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Cited in

(5)

• Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence
• An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions
• Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation
• Robust equilibria in tournaments
• Generalized consistent ranking and the formation of self-enforcing coalitions

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