Coalition formation in games with externalities
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Publication:6176202
DOI10.1007/s13235-022-00460-0zbMath1520.91054OpenAlexW1926823493MaRDI QIDQ6176202
Publication date: 25 July 2023
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00460-0
Related Items
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