A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers

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Publication:2564135

DOI10.1006/game.1996.0076zbMath0873.90125OpenAlexW2038607592MaRDI QIDQ2564135

Akira Okada

Publication date: 7 January 1997

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0076




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