Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2007.07.006zbMATH Open1161.91330OpenAlexW2042969573WikidataQ126211160 ScholiaQ126211160MaRDI QIDQ928023FDOQ928023

Authors: Juan J. Vidal-Puga 

Publication date: 11 June 2008

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2007.07.006

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zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumShapley NTU valuesequential formation of coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• The bargaining problem
• Bargaining and Value
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
• An \(N\)-person pure bargaining game
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
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• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• The Nash bargaining solution is optimal
• An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value
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• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• An implementation of the Owen value.
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
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• Reinterpreting the kernel
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• A comparison of non-transferable utility values
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the Existence and Interpretation of Value Allocation
• Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces
• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
• Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
• Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts
• On the Non-Transferable Utility Value: A Comment on the Roth-Shafer Examples
• Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements in a Cournot setting
• A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution

Cited In (14)

• Subgame-perfection in free transition games
• Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games
• A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements
• Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
• On the nucleolus as a power index
• Optimal coalition formation and surplus distribution: two sides of one coin
• Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
• The coalitional rationality of the Shapley value
• Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Random marginal and random removal values
• Potential, value, and coalition formation
• The selectope for cooperative games
• Coalition formation in games without side payments

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