Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution
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Publication:881982
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.06.001zbMath1142.91497OpenAlexW1994134440MaRDI QIDQ881982
Publication date: 23 May 2007
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15753
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (12)
Bargaining in endogenous trading networks ⋮ Negotiation problem ⋮ A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution ⋮ Sequential share bargaining ⋮ Bargaining for assembly ⋮ A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements ⋮ Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value ⋮ Multilateral non-cooperative bargaining in a general utility space ⋮ On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols ⋮ A noncooperative foundation of the competitive divisions for bads ⋮ Delay in a bargaining game with contracts ⋮ A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol
Cites Work
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