A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol

DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0365-5zbMath1166.91015OpenAlexW2010339374MaRDI QIDQ1028548

Sang-Chul Suh, Quan Wen

Publication date: 6 July 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0365-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Bargaining in endogenous trading networks ⋮ Breakdown in multilateral negotiations ⋮ Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game ⋮ Bargaining for assembly

Cites Work

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