Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol
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Publication:2424312
Recommendations
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Cites work
- A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
- Bargaining and Reputation
- Emergence and nonemergence of alternating offers in bilateral bargaining
- Endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game
- Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
- Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
- Recognition for sale
- Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures
Cited in
(6)- A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol
- Endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game
- Bargaining with costly competition for the right to propose
- A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
- Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash demand game
- A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
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