Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
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Publication:2455657
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Cites work
- A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
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- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
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- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
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Cited in
(24)- Optimal team size under legislative bargaining with costly recognition
- Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining
- Legislative bargaining with a stochastic surplus and costly~recognition
- Ideology and endogenous constitutions
- Bargaining with costly competition for the right to propose
- Coalitional bargaining games: a new concept of value and coalition formation
- Contests for catch shares
- Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals
- Recognition for sale
- Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining
- A bargaining model of endogenous procedures
- Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?
- Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- On discrimination in the optimal management of teams
- Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol
- Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda
- Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power
- Equality in legislative bargaining
- Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
- Bargaining and rent seeking: asymmetric equilibria with two investment levels
- Using ultimatum power as a leverage in resolving a bargaining conflict
- The political economy of technocratic governments
- A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown
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