Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.008zbMath1281.91097OpenAlexW2118647404MaRDI QIDQ2455657

Hüseyin Yıldırım

Publication date: 26 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1936

zbMATH Keywords

majority rulerecognitionsequential bargainingproposal powerrent-seeking contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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