Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining
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Publication:1753266
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.005zbMath1390.91019OpenAlexW2774789528MaRDI QIDQ1753266
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.005
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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