Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers
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Publication:1362605
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0553zbMath0882.90139OpenAlexW2076276151MaRDI QIDQ1362605
Publication date: 5 August 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0553
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