Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol

DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0681-3MaRDI QIDQ2453420zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel Cardona, Arnold Polanski

Publication date 6 June 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0681-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
• Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
• A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol
• Bargaining with costly competition for the right to propose

Cites work

• A dynamic theory of holdup.
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• A simple noncooperative core story
• Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
• Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers
• One-dimensional bargaining
• Order independent equilibria
• Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
• Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model

Cited in

(4)

• Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining
• Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem
• Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining
• A bargaining model of endogenous procedures

This page was built for publication: Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2453420)