Order independent equilibria
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Recommendations
- Stability of ordered equilibria
- Equilibria in games with ordered outcomes
- Equilibrium with incomplete markets without ordered preferences
- Equilibrium points in games with ordered outcomes
- Equilibrium without independence
- Nash equilibrium in games with ordered outcomes
- Equilibrium theory with satiable and non-ordered preferences
- Existence of equilibria in incomplete markets with non-ordered preferences
- Sequential Equilibria
- Equilibrium and quasi-equilibrium existence theorems for a general model without ordered preferences
Cited in
(30)- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
- Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
- The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games
- Exchanging good ideas.
- An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
- Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
- Equilibrium without independence
- Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core
- Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers
- A note on the individualistic foundations of the core in economies with asymmetric information
- Subgame perfect coalition formation
- Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games
- Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol
- Cooperative Games
- The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good
- Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
- Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
- Hart--Mas-Colell implementation of the discounted Shapley value
- Solving coalitional resource games
- Costless delay in negotiations
- Signaling, screening, and core stability
- On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols
- Consistency, converse consistency, and aspirations in TU-games.
- Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games
- Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
- The recursive core for non-superadditive games
- Cumulative offer process is order-independent
- Efficient coalitional bargaining with noncontingent offers
- The burning coalition bargaining model
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