The recursive core for non-superadditive games
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Publication:2344928
DOI10.3390/g1020066zbMath1311.91018OpenAlexW2041990537MaRDI QIDQ2344928
Chen-Ying Huang, Tomas Sjöström
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g1020066
Related Items (4)
Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core ⋮ The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games ⋮ A substitute for the classical Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function in cooperative differential games ⋮ STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER RESTRICTED COALITIONAL CHANGES
Cites Work
- Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
- A recursive core for partition function form games
- Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
- The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Non-cooperative implementation of the core
- Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
- Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
- Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Order independent equilibria
- Divide-and-permute
- Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
- A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
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