Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core
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Publication:898668
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.08.006zbMath1368.91015OpenAlexW2102546026MaRDI QIDQ898668
Publication date: 18 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://real.mtak.hu/33738/1/Koczy_Stationary_consistent...JME_u.pdf
partition functionimplementationexternalitiesstationary perfect equilibriumrecursive coretime consistent equilibrium
Related Items
Subgame perfect coalition formation ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities
Cites Work
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