Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.08.006zbMATH Open1368.91015OpenAlexW2102546026MaRDI QIDQ898668FDOQ898668

Authors: László Á. Kóczy 

Publication date: 18 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://real.mtak.hu/33738/1/Koczy_Stationary_consistent...JME_u.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

partition functionimplementationexternalitiesstationary perfect equilibriumrecursive coretime consistent equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• N‐person games in partition function form
• A recursive core for partition function form games
• A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation.
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
• The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
• Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
• Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
• Fixed rules and decision rules: time consistency and subgame perfection
• A simple noncooperative core story
• Bargaining without commitment
• A bargaining model with players' perceptions on the retractability of offers
• The recursive core for non-superadditive games
• Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games

Cited In (8)

• Subgame perfect coalition formation
• RECURSIVE SEQUENCES IDENTIFYING THE NUMBER OF EMBEDDED COALITIONS
• Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
• Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
• Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
• The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games
• Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities
• Coalition formation in games with externalities

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