Bargaining without commitment

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90023-NzbMath0754.90076OpenAlexW2141183308MaRDI QIDQ1196654

Abhinay Muthoo

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90023-n

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumsequential bargainingsupergame-type punishment strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (9)

A note on repeated-offers bargaining with one-sided incomplete information ⋮ A bargaining model with players' perceptions on the retractability of offers ⋮ Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games ⋮ A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model ⋮ Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures ⋮ FIRM SIZE AND PRICING POLICY ⋮ Bargaining without commitment ⋮ Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games

Cites Work

• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Bargaining without commitment
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

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