Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
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Publication:3730379
DOI10.2307/1913509zbMath0596.90107OpenAlexW2078388466MaRDI QIDQ3730379
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913509
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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