Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.04.004zbMATH Open1274.91228OpenAlexW1976548438MaRDI QIDQ645657FDOQ645657

Authors: Harold Houba, Quan Wen 

Publication date: 10 November 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.004

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zbMATH Keywords

bargainingnegotiationtime preferenceendogenous threatsHicks paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
• On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents
• The policy bargaining model
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions

Cited In (9)

• Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
• A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
• Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining
• Backward induction and unacceptable offers
• Different time preferences and non-stationary contracts in negotiations
• Relative concerns and delays in bargaining with private information
• Time preferences and bargaining
• Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility
• Bargaining with costly competition for the right to propose

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