Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4213719 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1323215 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
- A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
- Game theory
- Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions
- On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents
- Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
- Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
- The policy bargaining model
- The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors
Cited in
(9)- A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
- Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
- Different time preferences and non-stationary contracts in negotiations
- Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility
- Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining
- Time preferences and bargaining
- Relative concerns and delays in bargaining with private information
- Bargaining with costly competition for the right to propose
- Backward induction and unacceptable offers
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