The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games

DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0219-9zbMath1211.91065MaRDI QIDQ532747

Yuichi Yamamoto

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0219-9

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityconvexityrepeated gamepublic randomization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Time-Dependent Discounting, FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN DISCOUNTED SUPERGAMES, Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences, Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games, Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames, On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting, Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting, On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games

Cites Work

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• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information