The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games

DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0219-9MaRDI QIDQ532747zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuichi Yamamoto

Publication date 5 May 2011

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0219-9

zbMATH Keywords

convexitymonotonicitypublic randomizationrepeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
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• Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation.
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization

Cites work

• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?
• Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
• The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors

Cited in

(11)

• Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games
• Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames
• On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting
• Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?
• Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting
• On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• The folk theorem for repeated games with time-dependent discounting
• Fractal geometry of equilibrium payoffs in discounted supergames
• Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences
• Characterizing the feasible payoff set of OLG repeated games

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