On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.12.010MaRDI QIDQ2442844zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Johannes Hörner, Satoru Takahashi, Nicolas Vieille

Publication date 1 April 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.010

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesfolk theoremstochastic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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• Mediated partnerships
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• Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
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• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(10)

• Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting
• The repeated public goods game: a solution using tit-for-tat and the Lindahl point
• On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for \(\delta \rightarrow 1\) and a folk theorem
• Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620865 (Why is no real title available?)
• Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
• Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
• Limit equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games
• An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games

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