Limit equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games

DOI10.1287/MOOR.2019.1015zbMATH Open1455.91038OpenAlexW3006247341MaRDI QIDQ3387906FDOQ3387906

Authors: Jérôme Renault, Bruno Ziliotto 

Publication date: 8 January 2021

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/32488/1/limit_final.pdf

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• Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs
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zbMATH Keywords

folk theoremstochastic gameslimit equilibrium payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Stochastic Games
• A zero-sum stochastic game with compact action sets and no asymptotic value
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
• On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Two-player stochastic games. I: A reduction
• Two-player stochastic games. II: The case of recursive games
• Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
• Repeated Games
• Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
• The Asymptotic Theory of Stochastic Games
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Three-Player Absorbing Games
• General properties of long-run supergames
• Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Asymptotic properties of a non-zero sum stochastic game
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
• A short geometric proof that Hausdorff limits are definable in any o-minimal structure

Cited In (7)

• Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Denumerable state stochastic games with limiting average payoff
• Small perturbations and stochastic games
• On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games
• Limit optimal trajectories in zero-sum stochastic games
• Equilibrium in two-player stochastic games with shift-invariant payoffs

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