Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
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Publication:2639786
DOI10.1007/BF01761076zbMath0718.90105MaRDI QIDQ2639786
Publication date: 1990
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Nash equilibriaincomplete informationfolk theoremimperfect monitoringinfinitely repeated, \(n\)-player, undiscounted gameslower equilibriumupper equilibrium
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Cites Work
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- Some results on the existence of Nash equilibria for non-zero sum games with incomplete information
- Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
- Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
- Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
- Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition
- Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
- Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
- Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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