Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0701zbMath0952.91015OpenAlexW2070800928MaRDI QIDQ1304013

Tristan Tomala

Publication date: 5 December 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0701

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaequilibrium payoffsimperfect monitoringcollective punishmentsundiscounted repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations ⋮ Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation. ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games ⋮ General properties of long-run supergames ⋮ Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ A folk theorem for minority games

Cites Work

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• Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
• An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
• Internal correlation in repeated games
• Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation.
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information