Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.08.006zbMATH Open1394.91031OpenAlexW1749333978MaRDI QIDQ516965FDOQ516965

Authors: Joyee Deb, Julio González-Díaz, Jérôme Renault 

Publication date: 16 March 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/31996

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zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesanonymous random matchinguniform equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
• On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions
• Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
• Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• General properties of long-run supergames
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Social norms and random matching games
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?
• Social norms, cooperation and inequality
• A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting

Cited In (3)

• Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Social norms and random matching games
• The folk theorem in repeated games with anonymous random matching

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