Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games
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Publication:516965
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.006zbMath1394.91031OpenAlexW1749333978MaRDI QIDQ516965
Julio González-Díaz, Jérôme Renault, Joyee Deb
Publication date: 16 March 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/31996
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