When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?
From MaRDI portal
Publication:848606
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.002zbMath1202.91025OpenAlexW2079771759MaRDI QIDQ848606
Johannes Hörner, Olivier Gossner
Publication date: 4 March 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.002
entropysignalsrepeated gameconditional independencefolk theoremindividually rational payoffminmax payoff
Related Items (7)
A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games ⋮ Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games ⋮ Perfect information games where each player acts only once ⋮ Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games ⋮ A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games
- Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
- Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
- Team-maxmin equilibria
- Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
- The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
- A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- Strategic entropy and complexity in repeated games
- How to play with a biased coin?
- Repeated games with bounded entropy
- Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
- A Uniform Tauberian Theorem in Dynamic Programming
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Information Independence and Common Knowledge
- The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
- Empirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation
- Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- The Existence of Probability Measures with Given Marginals
- Comparaison, des mesures portées par un ensemble convexe compact
This page was built for publication: When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?