An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0624zbMath0910.90270OpenAlexW2152010822MaRDI QIDQ1268655

John Wooders, Diego Moreno

Publication date: 27 April 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4393

zbMATH Keywords

noncooperative gamespreplay communicationcoalition proof correlated equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44)

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