Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
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Publication:1367778
DOI10.1006/game.1996.0096zbMath0886.90189OpenAlexW2079643546WikidataQ56481627 ScholiaQ56481627MaRDI QIDQ1367778
Publication date: 19 April 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1744ca98aca5f13f4f2054910199c6f4cd530f23
coalitional communicationexistence of a coalition-proof correlated equilibriumiterated elimination of dominated strategies
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