Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
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Publication:2389298
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.034zbMath1165.91313MaRDI QIDQ2389298
Publication date: 15 July 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269733
91A12: Cooperative games
91B50: General equilibrium theory
91B44: Economics of information
91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory
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- Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy