Incomplete information, credibility and the core

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2005.02.006zbMATH Open1115.91036OpenAlexW3121825585MaRDI QIDQ2573263FDOQ2573263

Authors: Rajiv Vohra, Bhaskar Dutta 

Publication date: 7 November 2005

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://economics.brown.edu/sites/g/files/dprerj726/files/papers/wp03-21.pdf

Recommendations

• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2072559
• Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
• Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
• The incentive compatible coarse core when information is almost complete.

zbMATH Keywords

CoreAsymmetric informationCredibilityIncentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• The assignment game. I: The core
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
• Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies
• On the core of an economy with differential information
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• The core of economies with asymmetric information: An axiomatic approach.
• Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information
• The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
• Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core
• Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information
• A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies
• Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's \(M\)-form firm
• Coalition proof equilibrium in an adverse selection insurance economy

Cited In (19)

• Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information
• Information and Inaccuracy
• Small Informational Size and Interim Cores of Large Quasilinear Economies
• Core and equilibrium in incomplete markets
• Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
• Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
• Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies
• Cooperative games with incomplete information: some open problems
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
• Information transmission in coalitional voting games
• Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies
• Signaling, screening, and core stability
• The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information
• Group stability in matching with interdependent values
• Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information
• An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information
• Credible coalitions and the core

This page was built for publication: Incomplete information, credibility and the core

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2573263)