Incomplete information, credibility and the core
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2573263
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.02.006zbMath1115.91036OpenAlexW3121825585MaRDI QIDQ2573263
Publication date: 7 November 2005
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://economics.brown.edu/sites/g/files/dprerj726/files/papers/wp03-21.pdf
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