Incomplete information, credibility and the core
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- Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2072559
- Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
- Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
- The incentive compatible coarse core when information is almost complete.
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies
- Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies
- Coalition proof equilibrium in an adverse selection insurance economy
- Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information
- Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's \(M\)-form firm
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
- Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core
- Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
- Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
- On the core of an economy with differential information
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
- The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The core of economies with asymmetric information: An axiomatic approach.
- Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information
Cited in
(20)- The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information
- Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies
- Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information
- Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
- Group stability in matching with interdependent values
- Credible coalitions and the core
- Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies
- Information transmission in coalitional voting games
- Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.
- Core and equilibrium in incomplete markets
- Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
- Small informational size and interim cores of large quasilinear economies
- Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
- Signaling, screening, and core stability
- Cooperative games with incomplete information: some open problems
- Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
- Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
- Stability with one-sided incomplete information
- Information and Inaccuracy
- An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information
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