The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
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Publication:5475011
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00356zbMath1141.91595OpenAlexW2120144076MaRDI QIDQ5475011
Rajiv Vohra, Françoise Forges, Jean-Francois Mertens
Publication date: 16 June 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5454
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