Information transmission in coalitional voting games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.002zbMath1157.91332OpenAlexW3121804989MaRDI QIDQ2373769

Roberto Serrano, Rajiv Vohra

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/354

zbMATH Keywords

mediationcoreincomplete informationresiliencecoalitional voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (10)

Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning ⋮ Signaling, screening, and core stability ⋮ Small Informational Size and Interim Cores of Large Quasilinear Economies ⋮ Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core ⋮ Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies ⋮ The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information ⋮ Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information ⋮ The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information ⋮ Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies ⋮ COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS

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