Information transmission in coalitional voting games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.02.002zbMATH Open1157.91332OpenAlexW3121804989MaRDI QIDQ2373769FDOQ2373769

Authors: Roberto Serrano, Rajiv Vohra 

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/354

Recommendations

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zbMATH Keywords

mediationcoreincomplete informationresiliencecoalitional voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Non-cooperative implementation of the core
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• The core of economies with asymmetric information: An axiomatic approach.
• Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information
• Incomplete information, credibility and the core
• The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information
• Two remarks on the inner core
• The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
• Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement

Cited In (12)

• Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information
• Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation
• Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
• Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies
• Cooperative games with incomplete information: some open problems
• The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information
• Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
• Small informational size and interim cores of large quasilinear economies
• Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies
• Signaling, screening, and core stability
• The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information
• Information transmission and voting

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