The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
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Publication:4006253
DOI10.2307/2951674zbMath0751.90112OpenAlexW2081523315MaRDI QIDQ4006253
Publication date: 26 September 1992
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951674
private informationcontractprincipal-agent relationshipequilibrium allocationsinterim efficiencyPareto efficiency with asymmetric informationsignaling renegotiation
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