Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0491-9zbMATH Open1388.91088OpenAlexW805420204MaRDI QIDQ524967FDOQ524967

Authors: Kei Kawakami 

Publication date: 27 April 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/282794

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zbMATH Keywords

information aggregationlimited commitmentrenegotiation-proofnessposterior efficiencyposterior implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Optimality and robustness of the English auction
• Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
• Starting small and renegotiation
• Posterior efficiency
• Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement
• Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation

Cited In (1)

• Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem

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