Optimality and robustness of the English auction

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0817zbMath1003.91023MaRDI QIDQ5954065

Giuseppe Lopomo

Publication date: 30 January 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/23e6433e91d5c3daeffcff11903d10eea0bdad09

zbMATH Keywords

market models; English auction; risk-neutral seller

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions, The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle, Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids, Asymmetric English auctions., Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly, Auctions in which losers set the price

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