scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19089
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Publication:3976515
Cited in
(23)- Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
- A learning approach to auctions
- The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions
- Sequentially optimal auctions
- On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- Partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities
- On the regulation of procurement bids
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- A review of transport market modeling using game-theoretic principles
- Security bid auctions for agency contracts
- Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder
- Auctions in which losers set the price
- Constrained multi-object auctions and b-matching
- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
- A parametrization of the auction design space
- Optimality and robustness of the English auction
- English auctions with resale: an experimental study
- Common-value auctions with discrete private information
- Information revelation in auctions
- Auctions with entry
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