Recommendations
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions
- Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
- Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions
- Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
- Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
- Tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocity
- Collusion through communication in auctions
- A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
- Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities
Cites work
- A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
- Collusion and Price Rigidity
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19089 (Why is no real title available?)
- Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Cited in
(33)- Optimal collusion-proof auctions
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
- Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions
- Flow auctions
- Collusion through communication in auctions
- Commitment in first-price auctions
- Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!
- Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
- Optimal collusion with internal contracting
- Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
- Bidder collusion
- Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
- From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information
- Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions
- Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs
- Bribing in second-price auctions
- Tacit collusion with consumer preference costs
- Discounted quotas
- Using turn taking to achieve intertemporal cooperation and symmetry in infinitely repeated 2 2 games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1944103 (Why is no real title available?)
- Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors
- Variable temptations and black mark reputations
- Taking turns
- Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability
- Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions
- Dynamics of market making algorithms in dealer markets: Learning and tacit collusion
- Bidder collusion at first-price auctions
- The value of privacy in cartels: an analysis of the inner workings of a bidding ring
- Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
- Private monitoring in auctions
- Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
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