Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
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Publication:1421903
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00128-5zbMATH Open1059.91030OpenAlexW2063487923MaRDI QIDQ1421903FDOQ1421903
Authors: Andrzej Skrzypacz, Hugo A. Hopenhayn 
Publication date: 3 February 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00128-5
Recommendations
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions
- Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
- Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions
- Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
- Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
- Tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocity
- Collusion through communication in auctions
- A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
- Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Cites Work
- Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
- Collusion and Price Rigidity
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
Cited In (32)
- Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
- Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs
- Commitment in first-price auctions
- Collusion through communication in auctions
- Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
- Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability
- Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions
- Optimal collusion with internal contracting
- Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!
- Using turn taking to achieve intertemporal cooperation and symmetry in infinitely repeated \(2 \times 2\) games
- Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
- Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
- Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
- Dynamics of market making algorithms in dealer markets: Learning and tacit collusion
- Discounted quotas
- Private monitoring in auctions
- Flow auctions
- Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
- Optimal collusion-proof auctions
- Variable temptations and black mark reputations
- From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information
- Bidder collusion at first-price auctions
- Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors
- Bribing in second-price auctions
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- Tacit collusion with consumer preference costs
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Bidder collusion
- Taking turns
- Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions
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