Variable temptations and black mark reputations
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Recommendations
- Temptations and Dynamic Consistency
- Temptations and dynamic consistency
- Temptation with uncertain normative preference
- The reputation trap
- Temptation and revealed preference
- Multiple Temptations
- The dynamics of reputations
- Temptation and forward-guidance
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1487900
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
Cites work
- Collusion and Price Rigidity
- Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
- Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
- Information acquisition and reputation dynamics
- Microeconomic theory
- Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
- Repeated games with one-memory
- Restricted feedback in long term relationships
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- Social norms and random matching games
- Sustainable reputations with rating systems
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Variable temptations and black mark reputations
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