Variable temptations and black mark reputations
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Publication:485755
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.04.003zbMATH Open1302.91102OpenAlexW3124268738MaRDI QIDQ485755FDOQ485755
Authors: Christina Aperjis, Richard J. Zeckhauser, Yali Miao 
Publication date: 14 January 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:5027138
Recommendations
- Temptations and Dynamic Consistency
- Temptations and dynamic consistency
- Temptation with uncertain normative preference
- The reputation trap
- Temptation and revealed preference
- Multiple Temptations
- The dynamics of reputations
- Temptation and forward-guidance
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1487900
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Cites Work
- Microeconomic theory
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Repeated games with one-memory
- Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
- Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- Restricted feedback in long term relationships
- Collusion and Price Rigidity
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- Information acquisition and reputation dynamics
- Sustainable reputations with rating systems
- Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
- Social norms and random matching games
- Variable temptations and black mark reputations
Cited In (5)
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