Public trust and government betrayal

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.03.003zbMATH Open1141.91661OpenAlexW2000685927MaRDI QIDQ854929FDOQ854929

Authors: Christopher Phelan 

Publication date: 7 December 2006

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.003

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• Optimal policy with credibility concerns
• Cheating for the common good in a macroeconomic policy game.
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zbMATH Keywords

government reputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Cites Work

• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
• Who wants a good reputation?
• Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
• Repeated bargaining with persistent private information
• Reputation in dynamic games

Cited In (23)

• Crying about a strategic wolf: a theory of crime and warning
• Occurrence of deception under the oversight of a regulator having reputation concerns
• Optimal policy with credibility concerns
• Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes
• Crisis contracts
• Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover
• A model of multiproduct firm growth
• Limited records and reputation bubbles
• Bounded memory and incomplete information
• The political (in)stability of funded social security
• Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection
• Protests and reputation
• Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
• Reputation and impermanent types
• Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information
• Reputation building through costly adjustment
• Citizens' trust in government and their willingness-to-pay
• Sustainable reputations with rating systems
• Markov games with frequent actions and incomplete information -- the limit case
• Impermanent types and permanent reputations
• Reputation effects
• Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games
• Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games

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