Public trust and government betrayal
From MaRDI portal
Publication:854929
DOI10.21034/sr.283 10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.003; 10.21034/sr.283zbMath1141.91661MaRDI QIDQ854929
Publication date: 7 December 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.003
91D10: Models of societies, social and urban evolution
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Cites Work
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Reputation in dynamic games
- Repeated Bargaining with Persistent Private Information
- Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
- Who Wants a Good Reputation?
