Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4018096
DOI10.2307/2118369zbMath0825.90256OpenAlexW1528656328MaRDI QIDQ4018096
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64393
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