Truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games with intervention: an experimental study
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- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Truth, trust, and sanctions: on institutional selection in sender-receiver games
- Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
- Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
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