Truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games with intervention: an experimental study

DOI10.1007/s10058-013-0155-9zbMath1302.91053OpenAlexW2074269645MaRDI QIDQ483581

Ismail Saglam, Mehmet Yiğit Gürdal, Ayça Özdoğan

Publication date: 17 December 2014

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0155-9

zbMATH Keywords

truststrategic information transmissioninterventionsender-receiver gametruth-telling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• An experimental study of strategic information transmission
• Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game
• Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
• Enjoy the silence: An experiment on truth-telling
• An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
• Truth, Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender–Receiver Games*

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