An experimental study of strategic information transmission
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1904626
DOI10.1007/BF01211783zbMath0840.90042MaRDI QIDQ1904626
Arijit Mukherji, John Dickhaut, Kevin A. McCabe
Publication date: 8 February 1996
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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