Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
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Publication:2347765
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.03.011zbMATH Open1318.91038OpenAlexW2080360942MaRDI QIDQ2347765FDOQ2347765
Authors: Adrian de Groot Ruiz, Theo Offerman, Sander Onderstal 
Publication date: 8 June 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/15012.pdf
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Cites Work
- Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- An experimental study of strategic information transmission
- Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
- Strategic Information Transmission
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Evolutionary stability in games of communication
- Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games
- Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
- Communication between rational agents
- Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
- Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements
Cited In (10)
- Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games
- Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games
- Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
- Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
- Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
- The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent
- Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
- Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
- Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets
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