Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.03.011MaRDI QIDQ2347765zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Adrian de Groot Ruiz, Theo Offerman, Sander Onderstal

Publication date 8 June 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://papers.tinbergen.nl/15012.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimentACDCcheap talkrefinementcredible deviationneologism proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• An experimental study of strategic information transmission
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Communication between rational agents
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements
• Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
• Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
• Evolutionary stability in games of communication
• Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
• Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game

Cited in

(10)

• Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games
• Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games
• Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
• Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
• Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
• The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent
• Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
• Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
• Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets

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