Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2309zbMath0893.90183MaRDI QIDQ1371139

In-Uck Park

Publication date: 28 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2309

zbMATH Keywords

generic determinacy of equilibria; reduced form equilibria; sender-receiver cheap-talk games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

91B44: Economics of information

Related Items

Determinacy of equilibrium outcome distributions for zero sum and common utility games, Markov perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games, Determinacy of equilibrium in outcome game forms, Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes, Costly network formation and regular equilibria, Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games, On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games, Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games, The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games

Cites Work

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